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UNITED STATES JAYCEES (civic 
organization) 
, Arnold~ Lay, dissent---
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appts challenge the lower court's finding 
that a Minn. law prohibiting sex discrimination in "places of 
~.11/otE -- Th,:s iJ «----~ t'..,.v( t-l.e ~·~ /.r pt..-. i~?-~~t?Yfz-~ 
(.{"' t1 (./VI J€ lfle.L ~ • 
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( 
public accommodation" violates the First Amendment, and is vague, 
.-:-- /' 
/ 
if applied to the all-male Jaycees. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The Jaycees is a young 
men's civic and service organization with about 295,000 regular 
members. While women can participate in some of the Jaycees's 
activities as associate members, they cannot vote, hold office, 
or receive certain national awards. In 1974, the Minneapolis and 
St. Paul chapters began accepting women as full members. The 
national organization threatened to revoke their charters, and in 
1978 the chapters filed complaints with the Minn. Dept. of Human 
Rights under the Minn. Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ § 3 6 3. 01- .14 ("the Act") • The Act prohibits sex discrimination 
in "place[s] of public accommodation." A "place of public accom-
modation" is defined as 
a business, accommodation,~efreshment, entertainment, 
recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages or accommodations are ex-
tended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to 
the public. 
A hearing examiner found that the Jaycees had committed an unfair 
discriminatory practice under the Act, and entered a cease and 
desist order against the national organization. 
The Jaycees then instituted this suit in DC (Murphy, J.) 
claiming that application of the Act to it violated a constitu-
/( ~ 
tionally protected freedom of association, and, subsequently, 
that the Act was unconstitutionally vague as cons~rued. The DC __... 
certified to the Minn. Sup. Ct. the question of whether the Jay-
cees constitutes a "place of public accommodation," within the 
meaning of the Act. Th~inn. Sup. Ct. (Otis, J., for the court) 
answered in the affirmative. The court ' first found that the Jay-
cees was a "business" that sold leadership training to young men. 
It focused on the marketing approach of the organization 1 s re-
cruitment program--such as referring to prospective and current 
members as "customers"--and its stated aim of giving young men an 
"edge" in their careers. The court then found that the organiza-
1/ \ .. 
tion was a public business. (It is this finding that is the 
focus of the vagueness challenge.) The court identified two cri-
teria to separate public from private businesses: selectiveness 
of the group in admission of members, and existence of limits on 
size of the membership. A82. It rejected an analogy advanced 
the Jaycees to the Kiwanis organization, which the court termed a 
private organization; the court said the Jaycees "strives 
growth," and is unselective in those to whom it sells member-.. 
ships. A83. Finally, the state court found that the organ i za-
tion was a "facility." ~ree justices (Sheran, Peterson, Todd) 
dissented. 
The ~ejected the Jaycees 1 s constitutional challenge. v-;A8 
reversed. In its view, association for ends specifically men-
tioned in the First Amendment will prevail against all but "com-
pelling" state interests, while other kinds of association may be 
required to yield to less imperative public needs. Al8. The 
court placed the Jaycees in the former category. The court found 
that the personal development upon which the state court focused 
came as a by-product of various social, civic, and ideological ---activities. It found that, while the Jaycees is not primarily a 
----
7 
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group,/ "the advocacy of political and pu~ 
sele_c_t _e_d_ b_y the membership, is a not insubstantial par "/)1il' $~ 
it does." A22. Further, the court noted, while the content of 
most of its resolutions has nothing to do with sex, some change 
in the Jaycees's philosophical cast might reasonably be expected. 
It cited the parts of the Jaycee Creed affirming the "brotherhood 
of man," and its declaration that "free men" can best win eco-
nomic justice through the free enterprise system. A24. Finally, 
the court found that the Jaycees was not the only practicable way 
for women to advance themselves in business, and that the state 
might effectuate its policy through less instrusive means, such 
as withdrawal of tax-exempt status, prohibitions o~ official rec-
ognition of the organization, bars on employer support, etc. 
A30. 
The court also held that the Act as construed by the Minn. 
Sup. Ct. was void for vagueness. CAS found that the state court 
had not provided any discernible standard for distinguishing pub-
lie from private businesses. In particular, if found no basis in 
the record for distinguishing the Jaycees from the Kiwanis, which 
is an all-male organization of 300,000 members drawn from a 
cross-sect ion of business and professional 1 i fe. CAS did not 
reach an ~breadth challenge. 
Chief Judge Lay dissented. He noted that the Jaycees does 
not advance solely men's interests, and that the type of advocacy 
it has undertaken would not be curtailed or intimidated by re-
quiring the organization to accept women. The dissent found no 
basis for believing women members would alter the organization's 
( 
creed. On the vagueness challenge, Judge Lay noted that long 
usage as well as common understanding' provided content to the 
public-private distinction, citing, e.g., Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 110-112 (1972). He noted that one dis-
tinction between the Kiwanis and the Jaycees was that the latter 
limited membership from any one occupational classification to 
20% of the total. 
An equally divided en bane court declined to rehear the case. 
The dissenters (Lay, Heaney, Bright, McMi 11 ian) emphasized that 
the central purpose of the Jaycees is leadership training for 
business. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appts (state officials) assert that 
the question is substantial, noting that 33 states and D.C. have 
statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in places 
of public accommodation. (Two have held, contrary to the Minn. 
Sup. Ct. in this case, that the Jaycees is not a place of public 
accommodation, see u.s. Jaycees v. Richardet, ~66 P.2d 1008 
(Alaska 1983); U.S. Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. 
1981). Mass. agrees with the Minn. court, see NOW Br. at 3 4 
n.8.) Appts say that freedom of association does not have inde-
pendent constitutional status but rather is a derivative protec-
tion for values protected by the First Amendment, citing summary 
affirmances in Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 
421 u.s. 995 (1975) (business association unprotected), and Baker 
v. Nelson, 409 u.s. 810 (1972) (same sex marriage unprotected). 
The Court has also rejected association claims in the context of 
racially discriminatory private schools and unions. Runyon v. 
( 
{ ' 
McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 175-176 (1976); Railway Mail Ass'n v. 
Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945). HE?re, there is no evidence 
that the Jaycees's position on any social or political issue is 
one that would be dictated by sex. Appts also argue that the 
state interest in prohibiting sex discrimination is compelling. 
Finally, appts argue that CAS focused too narrowly on the mention 
of the Kiwanis in the Minn. Sup. Ct.'s opinion, which was dictum. 
The public-private distinction is well-establisher'. Appts urge 
summary reversal. 
New York and California have filed an amicus brief supporting 
appts. The y no t e that their public-accommodation statutes have 
recently been held applicable to th 
~ 
c er-boating c~. 
ScoiTcs---c>.~ica, 14 7 Cal. App. 
Boy Scouts and t0 a m~ 
o Counc i 1 of the Boy 
3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 
(1983) (discrimination on the basis of sexual preference); United 
States Power r: Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 
N.Y. 2d 4 01, 4 6 5 N.Y. S. 2d 8 71 ( 19 8 3) . ~~ They essentially repeat the 
argu~ents of appts. 
The National Organizat-ion for Women and other women's organi-
zations have filed an amicus brief supporting appts. Citing 
case0 rom this court and the lower courts, they say that the 
criteria for distinguishing public from private groups are nei-
ther novel or elusive; they list selectivity, size limitations, 
formality of membership procedures, attributes of member owner-
ship and government, and advertising to nonmembers. NOW Br. at 
26-27. 
Appee has filed a motion to affirm. It seeks an affirmance 
on First Amendment grounds, rather than ' narrow vagueness grounds, 
in order to lay to rest litigation it is facing in at least four 
other states. It says that there is a constitutional right to 
association, both as an expression in itself and as a means of 
protecting the expressed First Amendment guarantees, citing NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Griswold v. Conn., 381 u.s. 479, 
483 (1965), and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 u.s. 209, 231 
(1977). The State has failed to articulate any compelling inter-
est to thwart the chosen purpose of this particular, essentially 
private organization to serve only young men. Appee also says 
the statute as construed is void for vagueness, noting that 
greater precision is necessary when fundamental liberties are at 
stake, citing, ~, Grayned. Appee also suggests that the stat-
ute is now overbroad, since it could reach organizations based on 
ethnic and religious traditions, and that it violates equal pro-
tection, because of the different treatment of the Jaycees and 
the Kiwanis. 
4. DISCUSSION: The appeal appears proper. No one sug-
gests otherwise, and CAS said that the suit was one "to declare 
the statute, as applied and interpreted, unconstitutional." 
A2. 
All the parties agree that the questions raised by this case 
are substantial. The case implicates two related, unsettled 
areas of First Amendment law~he protection of rights of asso-
ciation where an organization is not solely or primarily engaged 
(£) 
in political speech, and the protection of rights of association 
for large, national organizations as opposed to smaller or nar-
rower ones. With four judges dissenting below, it is not obvious 
to me that CA8 got the answer right. 
While the case to a large extent turns on factual determina-
tions about the nature of the Jaycees, I suspect that will always 
be true in these cases; in any event, that is probably not a rea-
son to decline plenary review of an appeal. The factual dis-
putes, as well as the unsettled law here, seem to me to preclude 
summary treatment. 
The vagueness question is bound up with the merits in that an 
important consideration in deciding the extent of the Jaycees's 
First Amendment protection probably will be whether the holding 
can be limited to essentially public groups. In any case, I do 
{ 
\ 
not think CA8' s answer to the vagueness question is obviously 
correct either. As appts assert, CA8 does appear to have focused 
narrowly on the Kiwanis dictum, ignoring the selectivity and size 
criteria set out elsewhere in the Minn. Sup. Ct.'s opinion. Es-
pee ially in 1 igh t of the common use of the publ ic-pr iva te dis-
tinction, I suspect that the vagueness challenge will not prevent 
the Court from reaching the merits. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend NOTING probable 
jurisdiction. 
There is a mot ion to affirm, and two amicus briefs in 
support of the jurisdictional statement. 
December 13, 1983 Neuhaus Opin in appx 
~,;uurr; ••.••••••••••••••••• v or:ea on .................. , 1 Y • •• 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 83-724 




Also motions of National Organizations for Women and Northwestern Bell 
Telephone for leave to file briefs as amicus curiae. 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
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O'Connor, J .......................... . 
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
G D 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~n.prtm.t arattrt ltf t4t ~ittb ~tatt.e' 
Jhu~fringtlttt, ~. ar. 2llp~~ 
April 16, 1984 
No. 83-724 Roberts v. Jaycees 
(Scheduled for argument April 18, 1984) 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
In reading the briefs in this case, I realized 
that I have a possible reason to recuse myself. 
I have been an active member of several single 
sex clubs and organizations in the past and am still a 
sustaining member of the Junior League, an honorary member 
of the Soroptimists Club, and an active member of the 
Women's Forum and Executive Women in Government. There is 
discussion in the briefs of the possible ramifications of 
this case on other single sex organizations . 
. I welcome your counsel on whether I should 




Roberts v. The United States Jaycees 
Joseph Neuhaus April 17, 1984 
Question Presented 
Does the First Amendment prohibit Minnesota from requiring 
that the all-male Jaycees accept women as members? 
Summary of Facts & Decisions Below 
' 
The Jaycees is a civic and service organization that excludes 
women from leadership and voting roles. Its purpose is to incul-
cate civic interest and provide an opportunity for personal de-
velopment. App. to J.S. A-4. On complaint of certain local 
chapters that wished to admit women, a state hearing examiner 
found that the Jaycees' rule limiting full membership to men vio-
lated the state's anti-discrimination statute. The Jaycees then 
sued in federal DC, which certified a question to the Minn S Ct. 
The S Ct held that the Jaycees is a "place of public accommoda-
tion" within the meaning of the state law. Noting that the leg-
islature had expressly required a liberal construction of the 
II \\ 
law, A-73, the court found that the Jaycees was a business that 
sold membership in an organization whose aim is the advancement -
of its members, A-79. The DC held the application of the law to 
the Jaycees constitutional. CAB reversed. It held that the ap-
plication of the statute to the Jaycees infringed on their First 
Amendment right to join together in order to advocate political 
and public causes. It also held the law as construed by the Minn 
S Ct unconstitutionally vague because that court said that the 
law would not apply to the Kiwanis. 
Discussion 
I consider the Jaycees vagueness and overbreadth arguments 
insubstantial, and this memo discusses at length only the First 
Amendment challenge. In brief, I think the vagueness argument 
probably misinterprets the Minn S Ct's reference to the Kiwanis 
club. 
I 'e:Ld:c 
It would be silly to ~gy;.n the statute merely be-
cause of an off-hand reference in the opinion. On balance the 
state court provided adequate guidelines to distinguish between 
II ' ' public and private businesses. The overbreadth challenge depends 
on the Jaycees' claim that if they are a place of public accommo-
dation, many other groups--such as religious or ethnic groups--
would be as well. The fact is, however, that the Minn S Ct's 
application of the statute to the Jaycees depended heavily on the 
particular mix of business and nonbusiness aspects of the organi-
... -~ ....... --....... - .... 
zation. The record does not reveal whether the other groups the 
Jaycees cite have the same mix. 
1. Freedom of association generally. While the protection 
given to the right to associate with whom one chooses is far from 
~ - ~ 
defined, what seems reasonably clear is that whatever protection 
there is of association will be at its greatest in two si tua-
t~sG1Jhen "privacy" right~~e implicated, an<i'Jhen the associ-
ation is involved in protected First Amendment speech. Each of 
these poles of greatest protection can be illustrated by an ex-
treme example. The family or the marital couple is an associa-
tion that receives the highest protection from state inter fer-
ence. E.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494 (1977) (in-
validating ordinance barring grandmother from living with her 
grandsons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965) (ordi-
nance barring use of contraceptives). Groups engaged in advocacy 
of political or public causes also may be interfered with only 
for compelling state interests. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 u.s. 
449 (1958) (invalidating order requiring disclosure of membership 
1 is t s ) ; Bates v • C i t y of L i t t 1 e Rock , 3 61 U . S • 516 , 52 4 ( 19 6 0 ) 
' 
(same); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 15, 25 (197-6). In 
other areas, associational freedoms probably receive less protec-
tion. Thus a business--at least one of sufficient size not to 
implicate core pr i vac~· · concerns--can be prevented from excluding 
, 
blacks or women despite the owners' claim of freedom to associate 
with whom they like. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 u.s. 241, 250 (1964) (upholding application of Civil 
Rights Act to motel--associational freedoms not considered) ; Run-
.YQn.... v. McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 176 (1975) (private school may be 
forced to admit black children). 
In this case, it is plain that the state has advanced a gen-
eral interest that is of the highest importance. For these pur-
poses, there probably can be no distinction between the state's 
interest in combatting sexual discrimination and its interest in 
ending racial discrimination. Minnesota can certainly decide 
that the one is as important as the other. As a general matter, 
therefore, it is not necessary for the Court to consider the ex-
tent of the Constitution's protection for associations that are 
distant from the privacy and speech concerns discussed above. 
The state's interest clearly is sufficient to override any but 
these central associational interests. The crucial question in 
this case thus is how close the Jaycees' interest in excluding 
women is to privacy and First Amendment speech. 1 
1It might also be argued that the state's interest in 
ending discrimination attenuates as it reaches increasingly 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2. Privacy. The nature of freedom of association as it im-
plicates privacy concerns is that there are certain personal re-
lationships that our society believes are fundamental or tran-
scendent. A person has a right to enter into and maintain such 
relationships without any but the most essential or traditional 
restrictions. The idea is that these relationships are vital to 
the autonomy and dignity of the individual. This kind of freedom 
of association has not been extended beyond the family, as far as 
I have found. Compare Moore, supra (grandmother living with 
grandsons), with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 u.s. 1 
(1974) (ordinance may bar unrelated persons from living in single 
house). This Court has upheld laws requiring private schools and 
nonselective private swimming pools to admit blacks. See Runyon 
v. McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 175-179 (1976) (school); Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 u.s. 431 (1973) (pool--no 
constitutional question raised). 
Nevertheless, it may be that other relationships will be 
found to have at least some heightened protection. I can think 
of two examples. First, there are groups that are defined by 
intimate associations. I am not sure this is true, however. 
While it is true that ending discrimination in businesses and on 
mass transit has a more obvious effect than ending it , in more 
intimate settings like clubs and fraternities, I do not think it 
can said with any confidence that the state has a lesser interest 
in the latter than in the former. The state presumably is 
entitled to eliminate discrimination root and branch, and its 
interest in doing so may be as great in small institutions as it 
is in large ones. So I think it is more helpful to speak in 
terms of the constitutional protection of the association 
increasing rather than in terms of the state's interest 
decreasing. 
intimacy or exclusivity. If a state sought to force fraternities 
or private men's clubs to accept women or blacks (or whites, in 
some cases} the Constitution conceivably could offer protection. 
To require less selective admissions would be to destroy the es-
sence of the association, a result that might conflict with the 
central and traditional values of our society. See Moore, supra, 
at 503 (limits on substantive due process come from "'respect for 
the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic 
values that underlie our society'"} (quoting Justice Harlan in 
Griswold}. Second, and related, there are certain situations in 
which homogeneity is widely recognized as socially beneficial; 
the most obvious example is single-sex education. Thus, it may 
be that requiring the Cub Scouts to accept girls would detract 
from the efficacy of the education that Scouts receive. Cf. 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 u.s. 718, 739 
(1982} (Powell, J., dissenting} (noting "the continuing expres-
sions that single-sex institutions may offer singular advantages 
to their students"} (MUW does not control, of course: it only 
deals with the constitutional limitations on state discriminatory 
action, not with what limits a state may place on private dis-
criminatory conduct}. 
The Jaycees does not press the argument that its claim of 11. 
associational rights is linked to these privacy or autonomy val-
ues, and on the record here I do not think it could. It hardly 
,, ,, 
can be said that selectivity is the essence of the organization, 
or that requiring it to take women will destroy it. The Jaycees 
is utterly unselective about choosing its members, requiring only 
------------------
that they be men between 18 and 35. It encourages as large and 
diverse a membership as possible. The Minnesota chapters at 
issue here use no selection committee nor any backgroun9.,. checks. --- - -- ----
Appts' Br. at 8. Moreover, the Jaycees do not suggest that the 
things they do are done better in some constitutionally signifi-
cant way when only men are present. Its civic functions are, at 
least as a general matter, open to the public. In fact, since 
women belong as associate members, it appears that women are not 
excluded entirely from virtually anything the organization does--
except vote and award officers and honors. These functions are 
hardly at the center of the club, and no one argues otherwise. 
In short, the Jaycees is distinguishable from other, more 
selective men's clubs and from other institutions with sex re-
strictions on membership. These other institutions may be able ~ 
to advance a str~:::im tha~their right to choose their ~ asso-....,___ __ _ 
ciates is infringed by a state requirement that they not dis----· criminate against a certain class. But this organization can 
not, since so little "choice" appears to be involved. The 
state's decision that sex discrimination in admissions to the 
Jaycees is an evil needful of correction is legitimate and here 
controls, unless the Jaycees' First Amendment speech rights are 
infringed. 
3. First Amendment speech. The right to associate in order 
to protect and further the ability to exercise the enumerated 
First Amendment freedoms is more fully developed in the case law 
than the privacy concerns addressed above. It is well estab-
lished that a content-neutral regulation may be invalidated when 
applied to some organizations if it "is likely to affect adverse-
ly the ability of [the organization] and its members to pursue 
their collective effort to foster [their] beliefs." NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 u.s. 449, 462-463 (1958). As you noted in our dis-
cussion today, the speech or beliefs may "pertain to political, 
economic, religious or cul tur a! matters," id., at 460. The cru-
cia! question is whether the state regulation is in fact likely 
"to affect adversely" the organization's speech efforts. 
The Jaycees offer two arguments that admitting women would 
affect its speech. ~ it says, its very existence consti-
tutes speech--an expression of its belief that "young men need or 
deserve such an organization." Appee Br. at 19. Thus, changing 
the membership of 
its speech. Ibid. 
on public issues," 
any membership organization always influences 
~the Jaycees points to its "positions 
id., at 20, saying that requiring it to take 
women would alter the organization's focus on issues of special 
concern to young men. 
The first view has some appeal because it keeps the courts 
out of the question entirely, but it is probably too broad. Many 
important economic actors happen to be membership organizations, 
and the state surely has a right to keep the marketplace 
discrimination-free. The most obvious examples are labor unions. 
It cannot be that labor unions can exclude blacks or women solely 
because the union's existence stands for the proposition that 
white working men "need or deserve such an organization." See, 
e.g., Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 u.s. 88, 93-94 (1945) 
(union may not exclude blacks). The same is true of other eco-
~dAf~ 
• 4 ~oe.­.. ~ 
nomic actors. It is Minnesota's view that the Jaycees, ~ n i _.!;s 1 ~ 
t!~.k 
nonselective 1~elling of personal development and leadership ~ 
----~----------~-----------~ --- ~ ~f training, is such an economic actor. I do not think that simply 
----- , 72&f..~ 
because it is a membership organization it can avoid the scrutiny ~ #.a: I 
that would otherwise be applicable. 
If its status as a membership organization does not automati-
cally protect it, then the Jaycees seek refuge in the fact that 
they take positions on public issues. (The Jaycees does not ad-
vance any claim relating to nonpolitical speech. This choice is 
sound: political speech is entitled to the greatest First Amend-
ment protection, so if the Jaycees cannot win here, other speech 
will not help it.) It appears here that the Jaycees must make 
some showing that admitting women will influence its speech--that 
is, that the state restriction will somehow inhibit its exercise 
of its First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
u.s., at 176 (school had not shown that admitting blacks would 
"inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of [its segre-
gationist] ideas"). While I am reluctant to have the courts mak-
ing these determinations, I am inclined to agree that it is nee-
essary. Otherwise, undeniably important political entities--such 
as the Democratic or Republican parties--or economic actors that 
make political pronouncements--such as Mobil Oil Co.--could dis-
criminate on a claim that whatever speech they make would be in-
fluenced by altering their membership or staff. Such claims 
should be subjected to some scrutiny, to avoid exclusion of mi-
norities from mainstream politics or markets. Nonetheless, some 
~
deference should be given to the organization's choices in this 
regard. 
The case thus boils down to whether admitting women would 
require the Jaycees to alter the nature or expression of its pub-
lic positions. The Jaycees' best argument on this point is that -
while the "women's" position on any given issue is not certain, 
~
admitting women will force the organization to take positions on 
------------------ ·---------------------------------------------
certain "women's issues" that it now avoids, such as the ERA or 
abortion. I am dubious. I am not convinced that one can say -----.. 
with any fair degree of certainty that abortion is an issue that 
women, as opposed to men, care about and renewed draft registra-
tion or the war in Vietnam were not. As we discussed, moreover, 
deference to the organization's choices is not called for because 
I doubt that the Jaycees chose to exclude women because its po-
litical positions might be influenced. That is, I do not think 
the Jaycees has made a choice to allow only men into its organi-
zation so it will present the young men's political position: the 
speech part of the organization is a sideline, incidental to its 
main aim of personal and career development. It would be anoma-
lous to uphold the organization's restrictions on its membership 
in order to allow it to conduct what appears to be a minor part 
of its activities. Thus, since excluding women appears to have 
little to do with protected First Amendment speech, and since any 
other claim to associational freedom in a nonselective club must 
fall to the state's interest in ending sex discrimination, I rec-
ommend reversal. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.liJtFtmt Of#Url d tlft ~tb iltatt• 
-uftington, ~. (!f. 2ll~'l~ 
I 
April 17, 1984 
Re: No. 83-724 Roberts v. ~aycees 
Dear Sandra: 
I have seen your note to the Conference about 
disqualification on this subject, and I personally don't 
think you should disqualify yourself. If you disqualify 
yourself for this reason, I would guess that I and the 
other Members of the Court who belong to the Alfalfa Club 




cc: The Conference 
.§upumt afDurl of flrt %ilitb .§hrlt.s-
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CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
April 17, 1984 
No. 83-724 
Roberts v. Jaycees 
Dear Sandra, 
I too am a member of some single 
sex clubs, mostly honorary. I don't 








Apr~~ 18, 1984 
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1 "ioin" other Justices who arquably have some 
disqualify in thi~ case. 
Jo was an active member of the Junior 
many years, and still has some sort of status. 
remains an active member of the Women's Club of 






1 resigned from the Commonwealth Club and the 
Country Club of Virginia in Richmond, but belong to the Ali-
bi Club (only 50 members) • I also am a member of the Soci-
ety of the Cincinnati. 
If any member of the Court disqualifies because ~f 
family membership in a private club, perhaps others - in-
cluding myRelf - may be inclined to follow. I suppose there 
could be a guorum problem which would be unfortunate, and in 
my ~iew unnecessary. · 
Sincerely,. 
Justice o•r.onnor 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-724 
KATHRYN R. ROBERTS, ACTING COMMISSIONER, 
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ET AL. v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address a conflict between a 
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination 
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of associa-
tion asserted by members of a private organization. In the 
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jay-
cees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of the organization's members. We noted prob-
able jurisdiction, -- U. S. --, and now reverse. 
I 
A 
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as 
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership 
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national head-
quarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees, 
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue 
"such educational and charitable purposes as will pro-
mote and foster the growth and development of young 
men's civic organizations in the United States, designed 
to inculcate in the individual membership of such orga-
2 
83-724--0PINION 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic inter-
est, and as a supplementary education institution to pro-
vide them with opportunity for personal development 
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participa-
tion by young men in the affairs of their community, 
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and un-
derstanding among young men of all nations." Quoted 
in Brief for Appellee 2. 
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of member-
ship, including individual or regular members, associate indi-
vidual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is 
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while 
associate membership is available to individuals or groups 
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and 
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat 
lower than those charged regular members, may not · vote, 
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leader-
ship training and awards programs. The bylaws define a 
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute 
existing in any community within the United States, orga-
nized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the 
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The 
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an 
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each 
local chapter, with a national president and board of direc-
tors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had 
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affili-
ated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time 
about 11,915 associate members. The national organiza-
tion's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that 
women associate members make up about two percent of the 
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56. 
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the 
local chapters, although the state and national organizations 
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of 
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to 
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and na-
tional organizations. The national headquarters employs a 
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that 
are designed to enhance individual development, community 
development, and members' management skills. These ma-
terials include courses in public speaking and personal fi-
nances as well as community programs related to charity, 
sports, and public health. The national office also makes 
available to members a range of personal products, including 
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts. 
The programs, products, and other activities of the organiza-
tion are all regularly featured in publications made available 
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future." 
B 
In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. 
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regu-
lar members. Currently, the memberships and boards of di-
rectors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of 
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation 
of the national organization's bylaws for about ten years. 
The national organization has imposed a number of sanctions 
on the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the 
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state 
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to count 
their membership in computing votes at national con-
ventions. 
In December 1978, the president of the national organiza-
tion advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their char-
ters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the na-
tional board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving 
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of 
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women 
from full membership required by the national organization's 
83-724-0PINION 
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act), 
which provides in part: 
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice: 
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of a place of public accommodation be-
cause of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national 
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982). 
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the 
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertain-
ment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, of-
fered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." I d., 
§ 363.01, subd. 18. 
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota 
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to be-
lieve that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the 
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an 
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner. 
Before that hearing took place, however, the national orga-
nization brought suit against various state officials, appel-
lants here, in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged 
that, by requiring the organization to accept women as regu-
lar members, application of the Act would violate the male 
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association. 
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dis-
missed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be re-
newed in the event the state administrative proceeding re-
sulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees. 
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights De-
partment hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its 
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees orga-
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nization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act 
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice 
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered 
the national organization to cease and desist from discrimi-
nating against any member or applicant for membership on 
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minne-
sota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United 
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office ofHearing 
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979) 
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109. 
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District 
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a 
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the 
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32. 
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the af-
finnative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d 
764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court 
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public busi-
ness facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jay-
cees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and 
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; 
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits dues-
paying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a 
public business "facility'' in that it conducts its activities at 
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at 
768-774. 
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the 
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded 
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. Mc-
Clure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d 
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1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because 
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the 
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees] 
does," the organization's right to select its members is pro-
tected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. I d., at 1570. It further decided that applica-
tion of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership pol-
icies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference 
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily 
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id., 
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsi-
ble for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court con-
cluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination 
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference 
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organiza-
tion is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state 
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the 
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of 
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at 
1573-1574. 
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minne-
sota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court 
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Ki-
wanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act. 
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "pri-
vate" organizations from the "public accommodations" cov-
ered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act 
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1576-1578. 
II 
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected 
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line 
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of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter 
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must 
be secured against undue intrusion by the· State because of 
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual 
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this 
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fun-
damental element of personal liberty. In another set of deci-
sions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indis-
pensable means of preserving other individual liberties. 
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particu-
lar, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of 
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, 
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated. 
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the na-
ture and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom 
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one 
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is 
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to 
consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota stat-
ute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' free-
dom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive 
association. 
A 
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of 
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford 
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highjy per-
sonal r~ions~ most notably those arising in a famil"b-
(sontz~a substantial measure of sanctuary from uri}u tified 
interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 
U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every 
Insert for p. 8 at beginning of last paragraph. 
The personal affiliations that exemplify these 
considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant 
limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this 
sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the 
creation and sustenance of a family--marriage, e.g., Zablocki v. 
Redhail, supra; childbirth, ~, Carey v. Population Services 
Int'l, supra; the raising and education of children, e.g., Smith 
v. Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation with 
one's relatives,~, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, supra. 
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consideration that may underlie this type of ional 
protection, we have noted that :fami~ have played a 
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they 
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between 
the individual and the power of the State. See, e. g., Za-
blocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482-485 (1965); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 535. See also Gilmore 
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462 (1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). More-~ 
over, the constitutional shelter afforded f-amil-y~relationships ~~ 
reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protect-
ing~  relationships from unwarranted state interference 
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's 
identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, e. g., 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Orga-
nization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey 
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 
639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
-:(8eme s:J9eeial efiaP~-el~ipe-s~9ilt 
~Btrlimitatiens on-the seep8 of tllii k.ind..of..o9niltitat~ 
pretesti9n. Ey their nature;-a\:leh ~latioo.ships involve deep 
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other 
individuals with whom one shares not only a special commu-
nity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinc-
tively personal aspects of one's lif~-~n other things, 
therefore, they are distinguished byA.attFib1iil81ii Q;i iRtiHi&8S' .J<... ~--
~ 
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relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to 
begin and maintain the affiliation, J:and seclusion from others c c 1/13 ~~a ''ct I·~ J 
in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, 
only; a PeWieftShi.p.-that-ea:n-be degep.ibecl-as.J.itntimate" SQeme-'-
like y to reflect the considerations that have led to an under-
standing of freedom of association as an intrinsic element 
of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lackin 
qualities ef iBtimae~ such as a large business enterprise-
seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this constitu-
tional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubt-
edly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the 
selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations 
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees. Compare 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail 
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). 
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of 
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims 
to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the 
State. Determining the limits of state authority over an in-
dividual's freedom to enter into a particular association there-
fore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that 
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum 
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal at-
tachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 
160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not 
mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with 
any recision in this case, however, for several features of 
the Jaycees c ear Y. ~priv~f tl:l:e iBtirtutey that might reB 
~ ice of assoeiatee 'NeFtl:l:y of constitutional 
protection. 
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the 
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups. At the 
time of the state administrative hearing, the Minneapolis 
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul 
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from 
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local 
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chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for mem-
bership, and new members are routinely recruited and ad-
mitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of 
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176. 
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance 
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any 
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438 
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has 
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a 
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969) 
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same). 
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or 
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees at-
tend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and 
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See 
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders 
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities cen-
tral to the decision of many members to associate with one 
another, including many of the organization's various commu-
nity programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meet-
ings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103. 
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small 
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the 
formation and maintenance of the association involves the 
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Jaycees chap~ lack the distinctive 
characteristics ef: iHtiffiate ttsseeiatie that might afford con-
stitutional protection to the decision of its members to ex-
clude women. We turn therefore to consider the extent to 
which application of the Minnesota statute to compel the Jay-
cees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of ex-
pressive association. 
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B 
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to peti-
tion the Government for the redress of grievances could not 
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless 
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward 
those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Rent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on be-
half of shared goals is especially important in preserving 
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g. 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in 
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educa-
tional, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In 
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977). 
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe 
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among 
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or . 
withhold benefits from individuals because of their member-
ship in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of 
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g., 
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the 
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v. 
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the 
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minne-
sota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can 
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be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal struc-
ture or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces 
the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a 
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to 
express only those views that brought them together. Free-
dom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom 
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
supra, at 234-235. 
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, how-
ever, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified 
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, 
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign 
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wis-
consin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 488; 
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shel'ton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's 
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its 
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the 
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associ-
ational freedoms. 
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppres-
sion of speech, does not distinguish, between prohibited and 
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not li-
cense enforcement authorities to administer the statute on 
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See 
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the 
Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hamper-
ing the organization's ability to express its views. Instead, 
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects 
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating dis-
crimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. 
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That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest 
order. 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an exam-
ple of public accommodations laws that were adopted by 
some States beginning a decade before enactment of their 
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48 
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this 
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state 
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public 
accommodations. I d., at 19, 25. In response to that de-
cision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted stat-
utes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accom-
modations. These laws provided the primary means for 
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged 
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in 
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of Califor-
nia and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other 
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of 
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first 
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered 
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom dis-
crimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In 
1973, the ~innesota legislature added discrimination on the 
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute. 
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158, 
2164. 
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citi-
zenry from a number of serious social and personal harms. 
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal 
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that dis-
crimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions 
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces in-
83-724-0PINION 
14 ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
dividuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear 
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both· de-
prives persons of their individual dignity and denies society 
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and 
cultural life. See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These con-
cerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender dis-
crimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and 
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, which forbids race 
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that 
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation 
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing 
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies 
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimina-
tion on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently 
because of their race. 
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to 
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Al-
fred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609 
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of 
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many 
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional 
definition of public accommodations that reaches various 
forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W. 
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Ami-
cus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recog-
nition of the changing nature of the American economy and of 
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of re-
moving the barriers to economic advancement and political 
and social integration that have historically plagued certain 
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disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its con-
clusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public 
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minne-
sota court noted the various commercial programs and bene-
fits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills 
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promo-
tions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d, 
at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privi-
leges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state 
interests. 
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced 
those interests through the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate 
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male mem-
bers' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415 
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a 
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes 
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and so-
cial affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national 
and local levels of the organization have taken public posi-
tions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570; 
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly 
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising 
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under 
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 
(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for con-
cluding that admission of women as full voting members will 
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected 
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act re-
quires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the inter-
ests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the orga-
nization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or 
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philosophies different from those of its existing members. 
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (rec-
ognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves 
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'"). 
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the 
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its 
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim 
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a 
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are 
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S., at 483. 
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of 
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has 
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Ap-
peals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women 
members might have a different view or agenda with respect 
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some 
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be 
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the 
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men 
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as 
voting members will change the message communicated by 
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions 
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported 
by the record. In claiming that women might have a differ-
ent attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school 
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at 
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a 
different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's 
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported general-
izations about the relative interests and perspectives of men 
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Al-
though such generalizations may or may not have a statistical 
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by 
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decision-
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making that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See, 
e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti,-- U.S.--,----- (1984); 
Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S., at-----. In the ab-
sence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted 
by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyp-
ing that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing 
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change 
the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 
151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 
508 (1975). 
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some 
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that 
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the 
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of 
invidious discrimination cause unique evils that government 
has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the 
point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like 
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities 
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative 
impact, the actual practice of invidious discrimination by an 
individual or group-as distinguished from its advocacy-is 
entitled to no constitutional protection. Hishon v. King & 
Spalding,-- U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976). Compare NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982) 
(peaceful picketing) with id., at 916 (violence). In prohibit-
ing such practices in the distribution of publicly available 
goods and services, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds 
precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately con-
cerns" the State and abridges no more speech or associational 
freedom than is necessary to accomplish that purpose. See 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, ante, at-- U. S. 
-,-(1984). 
83-724-0PINION 
18 ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
III 
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minne-
sota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. 
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). There-
quirement that government articulate its aims with a reason-
able degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exer-
cised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative 
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger 
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the 
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the re-
quirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review. 
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U.S.--,-----
(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404 
(1966). 
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are 
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its 
face or as construed in this case. In determining that the 
Act reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used 
a number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the 
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of 
public facilities-typically employed in determining the ap-
plicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to 
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See, 
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F. 2d 96 
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little 
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33, 
aff'd mem., 67 N. J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See gener-
ally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals 
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construe-
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tion of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that 
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It never-
theless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a con-
stitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by 
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "pri-
vate" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at 
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, 
however, we read the illustrative reference to the 
Kiwanis Club, which the record indicates has a formal proce-
dure for choosing members on the basis of specific and selec-
tive criteria, as simply providing a further refinement of the 
standards used to determine whether an organization is "pub-
lic" or "private." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). 
By offering this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's opinion provided the statute with more, rather than 
less, definite content. 
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club 
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's con-
tention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The 
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping 
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the member-
ship decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide 
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes. 
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be 
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the 
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jay-
cees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations 
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W. 
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt 
limiting constructions that would exclude private groups 
from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used 
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine 
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act, 
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk 
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of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct. 
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217 
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address a conflict between a 
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination 
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of associa-
tion asserted by members of a private organization. In the 
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jay-
cees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of the organization's members. We noted prob-
able jurisdiction, -- U. S. --, and now reverse. 
I 
A 
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as 
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership 
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national head-
quarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees, 
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue 
"such educational and charitable purposes as will pro-
Md-~r mote and foster the growth and development of young 






ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic inter-
est, and as a supplementary education institution to pro-
vide them with opportunity for personal development 
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participa-
tion by young men in the affairs of their community, 
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and un-
derstanding among young men of all nations." Quoted 
in Brief for Appellee 2. 
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of member-
ship, including individual or regular members, associate indi-
vidual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is 
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while 
associate membership is available to individuals or groups 
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and 
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat 
lower than those charged regular members, may not vote, 
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leader-
ship training and awards programs. The bylaws define a 
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute 
existing in any community within the United States, orga-
nized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the 
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The 
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an 
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each 
local chapter, with a national president and board of direc-
tors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had 
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affili-
ated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time 
about 11,915 associate members. The national organiza-
tion's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that 
women associate members make up about two percent of the 
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56. 
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the 
local chapters, although the state and national organizations 
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of 
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to 
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and na-
tional organizations. The national headquarters employs a 
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that 
are designed to enhance individual development, community 
development, and members' management skills. These ma-
terials include courses in public speaking and personal fi-
nances as well as community programs related to charity, 
sports, and public health. The national office also makes 
available to members a range of personal products, including 
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts. 
The programs, products, and other activities of the organiza-
tion are all regularly featured in publications made available 
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future." 
B 
In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. 
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regu-
lar members. Currently, the memberships and boards of di- · 
rectors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of 
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation 
of the national organization's bylaws for about ten years. 
The national organization has imposed a number of sanctions 
on the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the 
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state 
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to. count 
their membership in computing votes at national con-
ventions. 
In December 1978, the president of the national organiza-
tion advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their char-
ters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the na-
tional board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving 
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of 
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women 
from full membership required by the national organization's 
83-724-0PINION 
4 ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act), 
which provides in part: 
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice: 
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of a place of public accommodation be-
cause of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national 
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. §363.03, subd. 3 (1982). 
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the 
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertain-
ment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, of-
fered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." I d., 
§ 363.01, subd. 18. 
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota 
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to be-
lieve that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the 
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an 
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner. 
Before that hearing took place, however, the national orga-
nization brought suit against various state officials, appel-
lants here, in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged 
that, by requiring the organi;t.:ation to accept women as regu-
lar members, application of the Act would violate the male 
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association. 
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dis-
missed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be re-
newed in the event the state administrative proceeding re-
sulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees. 
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights De-
partment hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its 
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclu-
sions oflaw. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees orga-
83-724-0PINION 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 5 
nization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act 
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice 
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered 
the national organization to cease and desist from discrimi-
nating against any member or applicant for membership on 
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minne-
sota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United 
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office of Hearing 
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979) 
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109. 
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District 
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a 
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the 
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32. 
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the af-
firmative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d 
764 (1981)~ Based on the Act's legislative history, the court 
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public busi-
ness facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jay-
cees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and 
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; 
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits dues-
paying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a 
public business "facility'' in that it conducts its activities at 
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at 
768-774. 
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the 
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded 
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. Mc-
Clure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d 
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1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because 
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the 
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees] 
does," the organization's right to select its members is pro-
tected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. I d., at 1570. It further decided that applica-
tion of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership pol-
icies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference 
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily 
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id., 
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsi-
ble for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court con-
cluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination 
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference 
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organiza-
tion is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state 
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the 
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of 
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at 
1573-1574. 
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minne-
sota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court 
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Ki-
wanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act. 
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "pri-
vate" organizations from the "public accommodations" cov-
ered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act 
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1576-1578. 
II 
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected 
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line 
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respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fun-
damental element of personal liberty. In another set of deci-
sions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
~ 1'-Amendment-speech, assembl , petition for the redress of 
grievances, and t e exerciSeOf religion. e onstitution 
guaranteeSfree<i o associatiOn of this kind as an indis-
pensable means of preserving other individual liberties. 
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particu-
lar, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of 
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, 
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated. 
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the na-
ture and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom 
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one 
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is 
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to 
consider separately the effect of a pl ·n the Mi e ta stat-
ute to e aycees on what could be called its member ' e-
dom o m 1ma e associa wn an t eir freedom of expressive 
A 
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of 
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford 
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of hi hly e -
sonal relationships, most notably those arising i 
contex , a suDSrantial measure of sanctuary from u · · ed 
interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every 
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consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional 
protection, we have noted that family bonds have played a 
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they 
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between 
the individual and the power of the State. See, e. g., Za-
blocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482-485 (1965); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 535. See also Gilmore 
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462 (1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U. S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). More-
over, the constitutional shelter afforded family relationships 
reflects the realization that individuals draw mucn of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protect-
ing such relationships from unwarranted state interference 
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's 
identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, e. g., 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Orga-
nization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey 
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 
639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
f\ Some s ecial characteristics of family relationships suggest 
relevant limi ations on t e scope offfifSkin o f constftiitional 
protectiOn. y err na ure, sue relations ps mvo ve eep 
attacliillents and commitments to the necessarily few OUier 
ind1v1 ua s WI n w om one s ares not only a special commu-
nity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinc-
tively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things, 
therefore, they are distinguished by attributes of intimacy-----_______.. 
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rel~ive~ess, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to 
begin and maintain the affiliation, an sec usion from others 
in critical aspects of the relationship. ~general matter, } 
onl a relationshi that can be described as "intimate" seems ~ 
likely to re ect the cons1 erations th_at have Ieat'o an un er- .._ ;:::::;"' 
stan ing o free om of--a8Soeiation as an mfrms1c e ement 
o persOiTiil lilie~ onverse y, an association lacking the 
qualities of intimacy-such as a large business enterprise- LJf--~ -
seems remote from the concerns g~ving r1se to this constitu- ~ ./. --.../ £/. _ 
tiona! protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubt- L ~-
1 edly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the a--~
selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations ~
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees. Compare -
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail 
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). 
Between these 
3
'poles: of course, lies a broad range of 
hum~that maymake greater or les~laims 
to cons 1tutwna rotection om pa 1cu ar incursions by the 
State:-ne erminmg e limits of state authority over an in- ~ 
dividual's freedom to enter into a particular association there-
fore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that 
relationsh!£'~ o~tive characteristics locate lt on a spectrum 
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal at-
tacmnen s. ee gen nyon v. cCrary, 427 U .'""S. 
160, 187-189 (197 (POWELL, J. concurring). We need not ~ 
mark the potential · · t points on this terrain with 
any precision in this case, however, for several features of ~ 
the Jaycees clearly deprive it of the intimacy that might ren- ~ 
der its members' choice of associates worthy of constitutional {) 
protection. 
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the 
Jaycees are large and basi call unselective grou At the 
time of the state admmistrative earmg, the Minneapolis 
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul 
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from 
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local 
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chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for mem-
bership, and new members are routinely recruited and ad-
mitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of 
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176. 
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance 
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any 
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438 
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has 
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a 
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969) 
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same). 
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or 
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees at-
tend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and 
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See 
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders 
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities cen-
tral to the decision of many members to associate with one 
another, including many of the organization's various commu-
nity programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meet-
ings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103. 
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small ----nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the 
f~d maintenance of the association involves the 
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Jaycees cha ters lack the distinctive 
characteristics o intimate association ord con-
stitutional protection o e ecision of its members to ex-
clude women. We turn therefore to consider the extent to 
which application of the Minnesota statute to compel the Jay-
cees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of ex-
pressive association. 
~,. 
I~ a Tt ~ 
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B 
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to peti-
tion the Government for the redress of grievances could not 
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless 
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward 
those ends were not also guaran e . ee, e. g., ent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on be-
half of ~ is especially important in preserving 
political -allilcuttural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g. 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment a corresponding ri ht to a§.§..O.Giate with others in 
pursuit of a wide variety of p~al, social, economic, educa-
tional reli 'ous and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware o., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In 
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977). 
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe 
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among 
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or 
withhold benefits from individua.t%because of their member-
ship in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of 
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g., 
V Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the 
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v. 
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the 
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minne-
sota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can 
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be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal struc-
ture or a arrs o an association than a regulation that forces 
the group to accept members it does not desrre. Such a 
regu a 10n rna mp r t e a 1 'ty o eo iginal members to 
express only those views that brought them together. Free-
dom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom 
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
supra, at 234-235. ( , , 
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, how-
ever, abso u e. · ge n o llatrlglit may be justified 
by regwations adopted to serve compelling state mterests, 
unrelated to thesuppression o11deas, that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign 
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wis-
consin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 488; 
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's 
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its 
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the 
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associ-
ational freedoms. 
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at th~uppres­
sion of speech, does not d1stmgriish between prohibited and 
pe~vity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not li-
cense enforcement authorities to administer the statute on 
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See 
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the 
Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hamper-
ing the organization's ability to express its views. Instead, 
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects 
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating dis-
crimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. 
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That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest 
order. 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an~m­
ple of .,public accommodations j aws that were adopted by 
some States begiruung a decade before enactment of their 
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48 
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this 
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state 
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public 
accommodations. Id., at 19, 25. In response to that de-
cision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted stat-
utes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accom-
modations. These laws provided the primary means for 
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged 
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in 
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of Califor-
nia and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other 
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of 
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first 
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered 
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom dis-
crimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In 
1973, the Minnesota legislature added discrimination on the 
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute. 
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158, 
2164. 
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citi-
zenry from a number of serious social and personal harms. 
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal 
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that dis- l 
crimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions 
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces in-
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dividuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear 
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both· de-
prives persons of their individual dignity and denies society 
the bene~ts of wide part~ation in political, economic, and 
cultural life. Se~ e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These con-
cerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender dis-
crimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and 
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, which forbids race 
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that 
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation 
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
ac~ess to public establishments.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing 
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies 
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimina-
tion on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently 
because of their race. 
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to 
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Al-
fred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609 
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of 
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many 
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional 
definition of public accommodations that reaches various 
forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W. 
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Ami-
cus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recog-
nition of the changing nature of the American economy and of 
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of re-
movin the barriers to economic advancement and olitical 
and social integration that ave historically plagued certain - __...... _____, 
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disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its con-
clusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public 
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minne-
sota court noted the various commercial programs and bene-
fits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills 
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promo-
tions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d, 
at 772. Ass~ring wo~n ~u~~ess to such goods, privi-
leges, and a~ C!early - fUrthers compelling state 
interests. 
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced 
those interests through the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate 
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male mem-
bers' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415 
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a 
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes 
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and so-
cial affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national 
and local levels of the organization have taken public posi-
tions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570; 
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly 
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising 
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under 
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 
(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for con-
cluding that admission of women as full voting members will 
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected 
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act re-
quires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the inter-
ests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the orga-
nization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or 
;~ 
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philosophies different from those of its existing members. 
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (rec-
ognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves 
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'"). 
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the 
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its 
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim 
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a 
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are 
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S., at 483. 
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of 
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has 
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Ap-
peals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women 
members might have a different view or agenda with respect 
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some 
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be 
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the 
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men 
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as 
voting members will change the message communicated by 
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions 
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported 
by the record. In claiming that women might have a differ-
ent attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school 
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at 
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a 
different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's 
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported general-
izations about the relative interests and perspectives of men 
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Al-
though such generalizations may or may not have a statistical 
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by 
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decision-
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making that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See, 
e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti,-- U.S.--,----- (1984); 
Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S., at-----. In the ab-
sence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted 
by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyp-
ing that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing 
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change 
the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 
151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 
508 (1975). 
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some I 
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that 
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the 
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of 
invidious discrimination cause unique evils that government 
has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the 
point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like 
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities 
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative 
impact, the actual practice of invidious discrimination by an 
individual or group-as distinguished om 1ts advocacy-is 
enti ed to no constitutional protection. Hishon v. King & 
Spalding,-- U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976). Compare NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982) 
(peaceful picketing) with id., at 916 (violence). In prohibit-
ing such practices in the distribution of publicly available 
goods and services, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds 
precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately con-
cerns" the State and abridges no more speech or associational 
freedom than is necessary to accomplish that purpose. See 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, ante, at-- U. S. 
-,-(1984). 
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III 
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minne-
sota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine reflects tfie principle that "a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. 
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). There-
quirement that government articulate its aims with a reason-
able degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exer-
cised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative 
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger 
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the 
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the re-
quirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review. 
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U. S. --, -----
(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404 
(1966). 
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are 
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its 
face or as construed in this case. In determining that the 
Act reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used 
a number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the 
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of 
public facilities-typically employed in determining the ap-
plicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to 
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See, 
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's ChristianAss'n, 397 F. 2d 96 
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little 
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33, 
aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See gener-
ally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals 
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construe-
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tion of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that 
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It never-
theless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a con-
stitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by 
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "pri-
vate" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at 
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, 
however, we read the illustrative reference to the 
Kiwanis Club, which the record indicates has a formal proce-
dure for choosing members on the basis of specific and selec-
tive criteria, as simply providing a further refinement of the 
standards used to determine whether an organization is "pub-
lic" or "private." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). 
By offering this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's opinion provided the statute with more, rather than 
less, definite content. 
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club 
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's con-
tention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The 
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping 
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the member-
ship decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide 
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes. 
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be 
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the 
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jay-
cees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations 
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W. 
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt 
limiting constructions that would exclude private groups 
from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used 
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine 
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act, 
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk 
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of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct. 
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217 
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed 
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June 12, 1984 
Re: 83-724 - Roberts v. u.s. Jaycees 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
When this case came up, I concluded I would "hear 
them out" and then decide on participation. 
A century ago (or is it a half?), I was President 
of the St. Paul Jr. Association. Later, I was national 
vice president. With some others I advocated that 
business and professional women be admitted on the same 
bas i s as men. It was an idea whose time had not arrived. 
It has now, even though the Minnesota opinion leaves 
something to be desired. 
As of now, it seems to me it would be better if I 
"recuse." 
CHAtt.4BERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.ilupumt <!f&turi ltf tlf.t ~ .i\bttt.e' 
._u.lfin!lhtn. ~. <!f. 211~"'' 
June 13, 1984 
Re: 83-724 - Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
Jen o i'I3/84 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: 83-724 Roberts v. US Jaycees 
You asked for my comments on your proposed note to WJB. I 
see now that the note is concerned only with his choice of labels 
for the idea he is developing. Since he uses the term "intimate" 
in quotes on p. 9, I am not sure that readers will think he is 
talking about the normal sense of the word, rather than the sense 
that is defined in the carryover sentence on page 9. Neverthe-
less, it is probably true, as you suggest, that the label will 
exert a subtle pressure in a direction that would tend to exclude 
at least the larger clubs of the sort you are talking about. 
I have three suggestions on your letter. F~, I have sug,... 
gested new language for one sentence on page 2. Se~I sug-
gest deleting the example you give on page 3. I am not sure what 
it is intended to show. I do not think it is needed merely as an 
example of a large club. And it may not be self-evident to all 
the Justices which side of the line of constitutional protection 
this particular club falls. T~ one other sentence of WJB's 
I 
opinion might also be cited to him, to wit, the final sentence of 
the only full paragraph on page 9. 
June 14, 19A4 
·~ 
83-724 Roberts v. ;r~ycees 
" Dear Bill: 
I am circulating the enclosen comments on your 
opinion to the Conference b~cause of the lateness of the 
Term. 
Normally I would exchanqe views Privately - as 
you and I frequently do. But in view of our hope to con-
clude this Term in another couple of wPeks, it mav bP help-
ful to get our thouqhts out on the table Promptly for all of 
us to see. 
I do think your opinion is excellent, and with 











.JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~tt}tttntt QI!tttri ltf firt Jni±th ~taitS' 
,ru!p:ttgbm, ~. <!J. 20gtJt.~ 
June 14, 1984 
Re: Roberts v. United States Jaycees, No. 83-724 
Dear Lewis: 
I'm delighted to adopt your very helpful suggestions 
and will incorporate them in the next circulation as per the 







Subject to the suggestions mentioned 
be happy to join your ~1ell written opinion. 
~. 
" You identify protected ~ fr~edom of association". 
"two distinct senses" (p. 6, 7). I am with you, and what 
you have written, with respect to the second of these: ac-
tivities protected by the First Amendment such as speech, 
assembly, etc. 
" 
/It seerns to me, however, that vou unnecessarily 
limit the first "sense" - "human relationships" - too nar-
rowly. The onlv example given ic::; the 11 family context", and 
, you emphasize the n<=>cessity that the relationships be "inti- ·:_. 
mate".• See particularly the first full sentence on paqe 9, · 
the final sentence of the full paragraph on p. a, and the 
next to last sentencP on page 10. 
, This opinion is likely to have its 
feet when a~plied to the enormous number and variety of 
clubs that are so tyoicallv American. Intimacy is 
to be a characteristic of most of these. 
be small. 
Rather than say that "only a relationship that'!! Can 
be described as 'intimate'" is likely to come within the 
concept of personal libertv (p. 9), would it not be more 
judicious simply to inentify - without indicating relative 
importance - some of the considerations that may be rele-
vant: e.g., selectivity, size, purpose, congeniality, and 
othe~ characte~iotics that mav in pa~ticular c~ses be · 
important. 
Very modest changes in some of the language on 
pages 7-10 would leave open for consideration on a case-by-
case basis the almost infinite types of "club" situations in 
our country. 
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Roberts v. United States 
Dear Bill, 
I have read with interest your 
exceedingly difficult case. While I 
Part IIB, I doubt that I will be abl it 
now stands. Memories of New York v 
fr~r me to be eager -t~o~g~o~a~1-o-n~~~~~~ 
exposition of constitutional rights to intimate association. 
I 
I am most uncomfortable with the material in Part IIA that 
begins on page 7 and ends at the end of the last full 
paragraph on page 9. 
Would you be willing to shorten Part IIA to something 
along the following lines instead? 
The Court has previously held that the 
formation and preservation of certain kinds 
of highly personal relationships, most 
notably those arising in a family context, 
find some measure of constitutional 
protection. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 u.s. 390, 399 (1923) 1 Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510, 534-535 (1925) 1 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205, 232 (1973) 1 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 u.s. 374, 383-386 
(1978). The relationships involved in these 
cases were distinguished by several 
attributes--relative smallness, high degree 
of selectivity in decisions to begin and 
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from 
others in critical aspects of the 
relationship. 
Whatever the precise scope of the 
constitutional protection involved in these 
cases may be, it certainly does not extend to 
an organization of 295,000 members divided 
into 7,400 local chapters that accepts into 
membership any and all male applicants within 
certain age groups. [From here on I would be 
I 
prepared to go along with the material of 
your Part IIA that starts with the runover 
paragraph on pp. 9-10 and ends at the bottom 
of p.lO. J 
Lewis has also written you about Part IIA and I do 
not disagree with his suggestions. 
2. 
I also wonder if your Part IIB might not be adjusted 
to include a somewhat greater emphasis on the commercial 
nature of the Jaycees' operation. I don't have anyth ing 
specific in mind here, but I do wish to avoid deciding the 
rights of, say, the Girl Scouts, the Boy Scouts, or other 
single-sex or single-race organizations that are less 
commercial in character than the Jaycees. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
June 15 , 1984 
83- 724 Roberts v . ~avc~es 
Dear Bill: 
~he changes in the draft you were good enough to 
"nark up" are entirely satisfactory with respect to the 
"personal affiliations" that - as you say - "attend the cre-
~tion and sustenanc~ of a family ••• " 
The cJarification you are making in the final sen-
tence of the full paragraph on p . 9 is Particularly helpful. 
I think some additional guidance would be given if this con-
cluding sentence were enlarged as follows: 
"We need not mark the potentially significant 
points on this terrain with any precision . 
We note only that factors that may be rele-
vant include size, purpose, policies, selec-
tivity, and other characteristics that in a 
particular case may be pertinent . In this 
case, however , several features of the Jay-
cees clearly place the organization outside 
of the category of relationships worthy of 
this kind of constitutional protection." 
If you could accommodate me on this clarification, 




.®u:prtntt <!fou.rt of tfrt 'J!Urittb ~hdts 
'masfrhtgtou. ~. <!f. 20.?JI.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 15, 1984 
No. 83-724-Roberts v. United States Jaycees 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 




.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.;§u:pr~ <!Jourt of tlyt ~ttit.l'~ ;itattg 
~N.ll!pttgfott. ta. <!f. 211§.)!.$ 
Re: No. 83-724 - Roberts v. United States Jaycees 
Dear Bill: 
At the end of your opinion, will you please add the 
following: 
"JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the 
decision of this case." 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-724 
KATHRYN R. ROBERTS, ACTING COMMISSIONER, 
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ET AL. v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address a conflict between a 
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination 
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of associa-
tion asserted by members of a private organization. In the 
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jay-
cees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of the organization's members. We noted prob-
able jurisdiction,-- U. S. --, and now reverse. 
I 
A 
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as 
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership 
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national head-
quarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees, 
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue 
"such educational and charitable purposes as will pro-
mote and foster the growth and development of young 
men's civic organizations in the United States, designed 
to inculcate in the individual membership of such orga-
2 
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nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic inter-
est, and as a supplementary education institution to pro-
vide them with opportunity for personal development 
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participa-
tion by young men in the affairs of their community, 
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and un-
derstanding among young men of all nations." Quoted 
in Brief for Appellee 2. 
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of member-
ship, including individual or regular members, associate indi-
vidual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is 
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while 
associate membership is available to individuals or groups 
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and 
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat 
lower than those charged regular members, may not vote, 
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leader-
ship training and awards programs. The bylaws define a 
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute 
existing in any community within the United States, orga-
nized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the 
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The 
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an 
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each 
local chapter, with a national president and board of direc-
tors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had 
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affili-
ated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time 
about 11,915 associate members. The national organiza-
tion's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that 
women associate members make up about two percent of the 
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56. 
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the 
local chapters, although the state and national organizations 
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of 
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to 
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and na-
tional organizations. The national headquarters employs a 
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that 
are designed to enhance individual development, community 
development, and members' management skills. These ma-
terials include courses in public speaking and personal fi-
nances as well as community programs related to charity, 
sports, and public health. The national office also makes 
available to members a range of personal products, including 
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts. 
The programs, products, and other activities of the organiza-
tion are all regularly featured in publications made available 
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future." 
B 
In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. 
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regu-
lar members. Currently, the memberships and boards of di-
rectors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of 
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation 
of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years. The 
national organization has imposed a number of sanctions on 
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the 
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state 
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to count 
their membership in computing votes at national con-
ventions. 
In December 1978, the president of the national organiza-
tion advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their char-
ters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the na-
tional board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving 
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of 
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women 
from full membership required by the national organization's 
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act), 
which provides in part: 
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice: 
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of a place of public accommodation be-
cause of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national 
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982). 
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the 
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertain-
ment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, of-
fered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." I d., 
§ 363.01, subd. 18. 
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota 
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to be-
lieve that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the 
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an 
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner. 
Before that hearing took place, however, the national orga-
nization brought suit against various state officials, appel-
lants here, in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged 
that, by requiring the organization to accept women as regu-
lar members, application of the Act would violate the male 
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association. 
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dis-
missed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be re-
newed in the event the state administrative proceeding re-
sulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees. 
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights De-
partment hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its 
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclu-
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sions oflaw. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees orga-
nization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act 
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice 
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered 
the national organization to cease and desist from discrimi-
nating against any member or applicant for membership on 
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minne-
sota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United 
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office ofHearing 
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979) 
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109. 
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District 
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a 
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the 
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32. 
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the af-
firmative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d 
764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court 
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public busi-
ness facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jay-
cees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and 
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; 
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits dues-
paying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a 
public business "facility'' in that it conducts its activities at 
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at 
768-774. 
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the 
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded 
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. Mc-
Clure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided 
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d 
1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because 
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the 
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees] 
does," the organization's right to select its members is pro-
tected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. ld., at 1570. It further decided that applica-
tion of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership pol-
icies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference 
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily 
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id., 
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsi-
ble for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court con-
cluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination 
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference 
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organiza-
tion is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state 
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the 
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of 
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at 
1573-1574. 
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minne-
sota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court 
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Ki-
wanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act. 
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "pri-
vate" organizations from the "public accommodations" cov-
ered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act 
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1576-1578. 
II 
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected 
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line 
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of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter 
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must 
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of 
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual 
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this 
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fun-
damental element of personal liberty. In another set of deci-
sions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indis-
pensable means of preserving other individual liberties. 
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particu-
lar, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of 
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, 
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated. 
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the na-
ture and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom 
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one 
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is 
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to 
consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota stat-
ute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' free-
dom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive 
association. 
A 
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of 
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford 
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly per-
1 
. "~ 
sonal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from ~-
unjustified interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identi-
fying every consideration that may underlie this type of 
constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of 
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personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and 
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting 
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and 
act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of 
the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 
383-386 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 
494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 
479, 482-485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 
535. See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 
556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462 
(1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter af-
forded such relationships reflects the realization that individ-
uals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties 
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwar-
ranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability in-
dependently to define one's identity that is central to any con-
cept of liberty. See, e. g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 
246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 
431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 
431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education 
v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
The personal affiliations that exemplify these consider-
ations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations 
on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of con-
stitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and 
sustenance of a family-marriage, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 
supra; childbirth, e. g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 
supra; the raising and education of children, e. g., Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation 
with one's relatives, e. g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
supra. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep 
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attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other 
individuals with whom one shares not only a special commu-
nity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinc-
tively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things, 
therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as rela-
tive smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to be-
gin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in 
critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, \ 
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to 
reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding 
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element 
of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these 
qualities-such as a large business enterprise-seems remote 
from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protec-
tion. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes 
constraints on the State's power to control the selection of 
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the 
choice of one's fellow employees. Compare Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail Ass'n v. 
Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). 
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of 
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims 
to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the 
State. Determining the limits of state authority over an in-
dividual's freedom to enter into a particular association there-
fore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that 
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum 
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal at-
tachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 
160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not 
mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with 
any precision. We note only that factors that may be rele- \ 
vant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, 
and other characteristics that in a particular case may be per-
tinent. In this case, however, several features of the Jay-
T 
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cees clearly place the organization outside of the category of ( 
relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection. 
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the 
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups. At the 
time of the state administrative hearing, the Minneapolis 
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul 
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from 
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local 
chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for mem-
bership, and new members are routinely recruited and ad-
mitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of 
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176. 
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance 
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any 
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438 
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has 
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a 
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969) 
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same). 
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or 
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees at-
tend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and 
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See 
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders 
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities cen-
tral to the decision of many members to associate with one 
another, including many of the organization's various commu-
nity programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meet-
ings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103. 
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small 
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the 
formation and maintenance of the association involves the 
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive 
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characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to l ~ 
the decision of its members to exclude women. We turn 
therefore to consider the extent to which application of the 
Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees to accept women in-
fringes the group's freedom of expressive association. 
B 
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to peti-
tion the Government for the redress of grievances could not 
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless 
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward 
those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Rent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on be-
half of shared goals is especially important in preserving 
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g. 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in 
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educa-
tional, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In 
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977). 
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe 
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among 
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or 
withhold benefits from individuals because of their member-
ship in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of 
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g., 
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Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the 
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v. 
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the 
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minne-
sota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can 
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal struc-
ture or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces 
the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a 
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to 
express only those views that brought them together. Free-
dom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom 
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
supra, at 234-235. 
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, how-
ever, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified 
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, 
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign 
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wis-
consin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 489; 
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's 
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its 
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the 
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associ-
ational freedoms. 
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppres-
sion of speech, does not distinguish between prohibited and 
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not li-
cense enforcement authorities to administer the statute on 
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See 
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the 
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Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hamper-
ing the organization's ability to express its views. Instead, 
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects 
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating dis-
crimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. 
That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest 
order. 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an exam-
ple of public accommodations laws that were adopted by 
some States beginning a decade before enactment of their 
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48 
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this 
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state 
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public 
accommodations. !d., at 19, 25. In response to that de-
cision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted stat-
utes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accom-
modations. These laws provided the primary means for 
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged 
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in 
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of Califor-
nia and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other 
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of 
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first 
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered 
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom dis-
crimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In 
1973, the Minnesota legislature added discrimination on the 
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute. 
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158, 
2164. 
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By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citi-
zenry from a number of serious social and personal harms. 
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal 
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that dis-
crimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions 
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces in-
dividuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear 
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both de-
prives persons of their individual dignity and denies society 
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and 
cultural life. See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These con-
cerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender dis-
crimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and 
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, which forbids race 
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that 
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation 
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.'" Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing 
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies 
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimina-
tion on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently 
because of their race. 
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to 
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Al-
fred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609 
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of 
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many 
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional 
definition of public accommodations that reaches various 
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forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W. 
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Ami-
cus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recog-
nition of the changing nature of the American economy and of 
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of re-
moving the barriers to economic advancement and political 
and social integration that have historically plagued certain 
disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its con-
clusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public 
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minne-
sota court noted the various commercial programs and bene-
fits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills 
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promo-
tions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d, 
at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privi-
leges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state 
interests. 
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced 
those interests through the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate 
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male mem-
bers' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415 
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a 
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes 
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and so-
cial affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national 
and local levels of the organization have taken public posi-
tions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570; 
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly 
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising 
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under 
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 
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(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for con-
cluding that admission of women as full voting members will 
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected 
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act re-
quires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the inter-
ests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the orga-
nization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or 
philosophies different from those of its existing members. 
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (rec-
ognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves 
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'"). 
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the 
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its 
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim 
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a 
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are 
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S., at 483. 
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of 
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has 
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Ap-
peals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women 
members might have a different view or agenda with respect 
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some 
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be 
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the 
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men 
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as 
voting members will change the message communicated by 
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions 
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported 
by the record. In claiming that women might have a differ-
ent attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school 
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at 
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a 
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different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's 
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported general-
izations about the relative interests and perspectives of men 
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Al-
though such generalizations may or may not have a statistical 
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by 
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decision-
making that relies uncritically on such underlying assump-
tions. See, e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti, -- U. S. --, 
----- (1984); Heckler v. Mathews, -- U. S., at 
-----. In the absence of a showing far more substan-
tial than that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge 
in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee's conten-
tion that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Min-
nesota Act will change the content or impact of the organiza-
tion's speech. Compare Wengler v. Druggists Mutual 
Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 151-152 (1980) with Schle-
singer v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 508 (1975). 
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some 
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that 
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the 
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of 
invidious discrimination cause unique evils that government 
has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the 
point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like 
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities 
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative 
impact, the actual practice of invidious discrimination by an 
individual or group-as distinguished from its advocacy-is 
entitled to no constitutional protection. Hishon v. King & 
Spalding,-- U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1976). Compare NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982) (peaceful 
picketing) with id., at 916 (violence). In prohibiting such 
practices in the distribution of publicly available goods and 
services, the Minnesota Act therefore "responds precisely to 
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the substantive problem which legitimately concerns" the 
State and abridges no more speech or associational freedom 
than is necessary to accomplish that purpose. See City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, -- U.S. --, 
(1984). 
III 
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minne-
sota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. 
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). There-
quirement that government articulate its aims with a reason-
able degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exer-
cised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative 
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger 
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the 
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the re-
quirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review. 
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U. S. --, -----
(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404 
(1966). 
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are 
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its 
face or as construed in this case. In deciding that the Act 
reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a 
number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the 
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of 
public facilities-typically employed in determining the ap-
plicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to 
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See, 
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F. 2d 96 
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(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little 
League Baseball, Inc., 127 N. J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33, 
aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See gener-
ally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals 
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construc-
tion of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that 
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It never-
theless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a con-
stitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by 
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "pri-
vate" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at 
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, 
however, we read the illustrative reference to the Kiwanis 
Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for 
choosing members on the basis of specific and selective crite-
ria, as simply providing a further refinement of the standards 
used to determine whether an organization is "public" or "pri-
vate." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). By offering 
this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's opin-
ion provided the statute with more, rather than less, definite 
content. 
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club 
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's con-
tention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The 
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping 
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the member-
ship decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide 
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes. 
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be 
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the 
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jay-
cees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations 
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W. 
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt 
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limiting constructions that would exclude private groups 
from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used 
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine 
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act, 
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk 
of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct. 
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217 
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part 
in the decision of this case. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-724 
KATHRYN R. ROBERTS, ACTING COMMISSIONER, 
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ET AL. v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1984] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to address a conflict between a 
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination 
against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of associa-
tion asserted by members of a private organization. In the 
decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that, by requiring the United States Jay-
cees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of the organization's members. We noted prob-
able jurisdiction, -- U. S. --, and now reverse. 
I 
A 
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as 
the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership 
corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national head-
quarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The objective of the Jaycees, 
as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue 
"such educational and charitable purposes as will pro-
mote and foster the growth and development of young 
men's civic organizations in the United States, designed 
to inculcate in the individual m mbership of such orga-
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nization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic inter-
est, and as a supplementary education institution to pro-
vide them with opportunity for personal development 
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participa-
tion by young men in the affairs of their community, 
state and nation, and to develop true friendship and un-
derstanding among young men of all nations." Quoted 
in Brief for Appellee 2. 
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of member-
ship, including individual or regular members, associate indi-
vidual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is 
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while 
associate membership is available to individuals or groups 
ineligible for regular membership, principally women and 
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat 
lower than those charged regular members, may not vote, 
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leader-
ship training and awards programs. The bylaws define a 
local chapter as "any young men's organization of good repute 
existing in any community within the United States, orga-
nized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" of the 
national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The 
ultimate policymaking authority of the Jaycees rests with an 
annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each 
local chapter, with a national president and board of direc-
tors. At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had 
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affili-
ated with 51 state organizations. There were at that time 
about 11,915 associate members. The national organiza-
tion's Executive Vice President estimated at trial that 
women associate members make up about two percent of the 
Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56. 
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the 
local chapters, although the state and national organizations 
are also actively involved in recruitment through a variety of 
promotional activities. A new regular member pays an ini-
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tial fee followed by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled to 
participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and na-
tional organizations. The national headquarters employs a 
staff to develop "program kits" for use by local chapters that 
are designed to enhance individual development, community 
development, and members' management skills. These ma-
terials include courses in public speaking and personal fi-
nances as well as community programs related to charity, 
sports, and public health. The national office also makes 
available to members a range of personal products, including 
travel accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts. 
The programs, products, and other activities of the organiza-
tion are all regularly featured in publications made available 
to the membership, including a magazine entitled "Future." 
B 
In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. 
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women as regu-
lar members. Currently, the memberships and boards of di-
rectors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of 
women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation 
of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years. The 
national organization has imposed a number of sanctions on 
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the 
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state 
or national office or awards programs, and refusing to count 
their membership in computing votes at national con-
ventions. 
In December 1978, the president of the national organiza-
tion advised both chapters that a motion to revoke their char-
ters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the na-
tional board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving 
this notification, members of both chapters filed charges of 
discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human 
Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women 
from full membership required by the national organization's 
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bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act), 
which provides in part: 
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice: 
"To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of a place of public accommodation be-
cause of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national 
origin or sex." Minn. Stat. §363.03, subd. 3 (1982). 
The term "place of public accommodation" is defined in the 
Act as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertain-
ment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, of-
fered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." ld., 
§ 363.01, subd. 18. 
After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota 
Department of Human Rights found probable cause to be-
lieve that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the 
national organization violated the statute and ordered that an 
evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner. 
Before that hearing took place, however, the national orga-
nization brought suit against various state officials, appel-
lants here, in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
to prevent enforcement of the Act. The complaint alleged 
that, by requiring the organization to accept women as regu-
lar members, application of the Act would violate the male 
members' constitutional rights of free speech and association. 
With the agreement of the parties, the District Court dis-
missed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could be re-
newed in the event the state administrative proceeding re-
sulted in a ruling adverse to the Jaycees. 
The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights De-
partment hearing examiner then went forward and, upon its 
completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and conclu-
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sions oflaw. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees orga-
nization is a "place of public accommodation" within the Act 
and that it had engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice 
by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered 
the national organization to cease and desist from discrimi-
nating against any member or applicant for membership on 
the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minne-
sota affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United 
States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB (Minn. Office of Hearing 
Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, October 9, 1979) 
(hereinafter "Report"), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109. 
The Jaycees then filed a renewed complaint in the District 
Court, which in turn certified to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a 
"place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the 
State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32. 
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that question in the af-
firmative. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N. W. 2d 
764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court 
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public busi-
ness facility." Id., at 768. It then concluded that the Jay-
cees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells goods and 
extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; 
(b) is a "public" business in that it solicits and recruits dues-
paying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a 
public business "facility" in that it conducts its activities at 
fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. I d., at 
768-774. 
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended their complaint in the 
District Court to add a claim that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded 
to trial, after which the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of the state officials. United States Jaycees v. Mc-
Clure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, a divided 
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 709 F. 2d 
1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because 
"the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by the 
membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees] 
does," the organization's right to select its members is pro-
tected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. I d., at 1570. It further decided that applica-
tion of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' membership pol-
icies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference 
with that freedom, id., at 1572, because it would necessarily 
result in "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast," id., 
at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those responsi-
ble for maintaining the policy, id., at 1572. The court con-
cluded that the State's interest in eradicating discrimination 
is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this interference 
with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the organiza-
tion is not wholly "public," id., at 1571-1572, 1573, the state 
interest had been asserted selectively, id., at 1573, and the 
anti-discrimination policy could be served in a number of 
ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id., at 
1573-1574. 
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minne-
sota statute is vague as construed and applied and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court 
relied on a statement in the opinion of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Jaycees, the Ki-
wanis Club is "private" and therefore not subject to the Act. 
By failing to provide any criteria that distinguish such "pri-
vate" organizations from the "public accommodations" cov-
ered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act 
unconstitutionally vague. !d., at 1576-1578. 
II 
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected 
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line 
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of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter 
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must 
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of 
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual 
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this 
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fun-
damental element of personal liberty. In another set of deci-
sions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indis-
pensable means of preserving other individual liberties. 
The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association may, of course, coincide. In particu-
lar, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of 
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, 
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated. 
The Jaycees contend that this is such a case. Still, the na-
ture and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom 
of association may vary depending on the extent to which one 
or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is 
at stake in a given case. We therefore find it useful to 
consider separately the effect of applying the Minnesota stat-
ute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' free-
dom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive 
association. 
A 
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of 
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford 
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly per-
sonal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from 
unjustified interference by the State. E. g., Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identi-
fying every consideration that may underlie this type of 
constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of 
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personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and 
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting 
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and 
act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of 
the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 
383-386 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 
494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U. S. 205, 232 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 
479, 482-485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 
535. See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 
556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-462 
(1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter af-
forded such relationships reflects the realization that individ-
uals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties 
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwar-
ranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability in-
dependently to define one's identity that is central to any con-
cept of liberty. See, e. g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 
246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 
431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 
431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education 
v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
The personal affiliations that exemplify these consider-
ations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations 
on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of con-
stitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and 
sustenance of a family-marriage, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 
supra; childbirth, e. g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 
supra; the raising and education of children, e. g., Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation 
with one's relatives, e. g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
supra. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep 
83-724-0PINION 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 9 
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other 
individuals with whom one shares not only a special commu-
nity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinc-
tively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things, 
therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as rela-
tive smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to be-
gin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in 
critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, 
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to 
reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding 
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element 
of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these 
qualities-such as a large business enterprise-seems remote 
from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protec-
tion. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes 
constraints on the State's power to control the selection of 
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the 
choice of one's fellow employees. Compare Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) with Railway Mail Ass'n v. 
Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). 
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of 
human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims 
to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the 
State. Determining the limits of state authority over an in-
dividual's freedom to enter into a particular association there-
fore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that 
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum 
from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal at-
tachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 
160, 187-189 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not 
mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with 
any precision. We note only that factors that may be rele-
vant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, 
and other characteristics that in a particular case may be per-
tinent. In this case, however, several features of the Jay-
83-724-0PINION 
10 ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
cees clearly place the organization outside of the category of 
relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection. 
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the 
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups. At the 
time of the state administrative hearing, the Minneapolis 
chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul 
chapter had about 400. Report A-99, A-100. Apart from 
age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local 
chapters employs any criteria for judging applicants for mem-
bership, and new members are routinely recruited and ad-
mitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See I Tr. of 
State Administrative Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176. 
In fact, a local officer testified that he could recall no instance 
in which an applicant had been denied membership on any 
basis other than age or sex. I d., at 135. Cf. Tillman v. 
Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431, 438 
(1973) (organization whose only selection criteria is race has 
"no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a 
private club exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969) 
(same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 302 (1969) (same). 
Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or 
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees at-
tend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and 
engage in many of the organization's social functions. See 
Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous non-members of both genders 
regularly participate in a substantial portion of activities cen-
tral to the decision of many members to associate with one 
another, including many of the organization's various commu-
nity programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meet-
ings. See, e. g., 305 N. W. 2d, at 772; Report A102, A103. 
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small 
nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the 
formation and maintenance of the association involves the 
participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive 
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characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to 
the decision of its members to exclude women. We turn 
therefore to consider the extent to which application of the 
Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees to accept women in-
fringes the group's freedom of expressive association. 
B 
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to peti-
tion the Government for the redress of grievances could not 
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless 
a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward 
those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Rent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 
294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on be-
half of shared goals is especially important in preserving 
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g. 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S., at 575; Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 482-485; NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 
462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in 
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educa-
tional, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In 
re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231 (1977). 
Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe 
upon this freedom can take a number of forms. Among 
other things, government may seek to impose penalties or 
withhold benefits from individuals because of their member-
ship in a disfavored group, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180-184 (1972); it may attempt to require disclosure of 
the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e. g., 
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Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 
U. S. 87, 91-92 (1982); and it may try to interfere with the 
internal organization or affairs of the group, e. g., Cousins v. 
Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1975). By requiring the 
Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minne-
sota Act works an infringement of the last type. There can 
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal struc-
ture or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces 
the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a 
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to 
express only those views that brought them together. Free-
dom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom 
not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
supra, at 234-235. 
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, how-
ever, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified 
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, 
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms. E. g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign 
Committee, 459 U. S., at 91-92; Democratic Party v. Wis-
consin, 450 U. S., at 124; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 
(1976) (per curiam); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 489; 
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's 
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its 
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the 
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associ-
ational freedoms. 
On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppres-
sion of speech, does not distinguish between prohibited and 
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not li-
cense enforcement authorities to administer the statute on 
the basis of such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See 
also infra, at 18-19. Nor do the Jaycees contend that the 
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Act has been applied in this case for the purpose of hamper-
ing the organization's ability to express its views. Instead, 
as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act reflects 
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating dis-
crimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. 
That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest 
order. 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an exam-
ple of public accommodations laws that were adopted by 
some States beginning a decade before enactment of their 
federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 48 
Stat. 335. See Survey, 7 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 
238 (1978) (hereinafter NYU Survey). Indeed, when this 
Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state 
laws imposed a variety of equal access obligations on public 
accommodations. Id., at 19, 25. In response to that de-
cision, many more States, including Minnesota, adopted stat-
utes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accom-
modations. These laws provided the primary means for 
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged 
groups until the Federal Government reentered the field in 
1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for the States of Califor-
nia and New York as Amicus Curiae 1. Like many other 
States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of 
its public accommodations law in the years since it was first 
enacted, both with respect to the number and type of covered 
facilities and with respect to the groups against whom dis-
crimination is forbidden. See 305 N. W. 2d, at 766-768. In 
1973, the Minnesota legislature added discrimination on the 
basis of sex to the types of conduct prohibited by the statute. 
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158, 
2164. 
83-724-0PINION 
14 ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citi-
zenry from a number of serious social and personal harms. 
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal 
Protection Clause, this Court has frequently noted that dis-
crimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions 
about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces in-
dividuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear 
no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both de-
prives persons of their individual dignity and denies society 
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and 
cultural life. See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U. S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U. S. 677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These con-
cerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender dis-
crimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and 
services. Thus, in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. ·C. § 2000a, which forbids race 
discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that 
its "fundamental object ... was to vindicate 'the deprivation 
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.' " Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing 
injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies 
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimina-
tion on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently 
because of their race. 
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to 
the provision of purely tangible goods and services. See Al-
fred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U. S. 592, 609 
(1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of 
public access on behalf of its citizens. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 81-88 (1980). Like many 
States and municipalities, Minnesota has adopted a functional 
definition of public accommodations that reaches various 
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forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. See 305 N. W. 
2d, at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Ami-
cus Curiae 15-16. This expansive definition reflects a recog-
nition of the changing nature of the American economy and of 
the importance, both to the individual and to society, of re-
moving the barriers to economic advancement and political 
and social integration that have historically plagued certain 
disadvantaged groups, including women. See Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, supra, at 684-686. Thus, in explaining its con-
clusion that the Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public 
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act, the Minne-
sota court noted the various commercial programs and bene-
fits offered to members and stated that, "[l]eadership skills 
are 'goods,' [and] business contacts and employment promo-
tions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' .... " 305 N. W. 2d, 
at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privi-
leges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state 
interests. 
In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced 
those interests through the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees have failed to demonstrate 
that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male mem-
bers' freedom of expressive association. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S., at 71-74; American Party v. White, 415 
U. S., at 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a 
"not insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes 
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and so-
cial affairs. 709 F. 2d, at 1570. Over the years, the national 
and local levels of the organization have taken public posi-
tions on a number of diverse issues, see id., at 1569-1570; 
Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the Jaycees regularly 
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising 
and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under 
the First Amendment, ibid., see, e. g., Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 
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(1980). There is, however, no basis in the record for con-
cluding that admission of women as full voting members will 
impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected 
activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act re-
quires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the inter-
ests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the orga-
nization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or 
philosophies different from those of its existing members. 
Cf. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S., at 122 (rec-
ognizing the right of political parties to "protect themselves 
'from intrusion by those with adverse political principles'"). 
Moreover, the Jaycees already invite women to share the 
group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its 
training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim 
that admission of women as full voting members will impair a 
symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are 
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. Cf. Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S., at 483. 
While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of 
the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has 
nothing to do with sex," 709 F. 2d, at 1571, the Court of Ap-
peals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women 
members might have a different view or agenda with respect 
to these matters so that, if they are allowed to vote, "some 
change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably be 
expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the 
Jaycees is organized to promote the views of young men 
whatever those views happen to be, admission of women as 
voting members will change the message communicated by 
the group's speech because of the gender-based assumptions 
of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is supported 
by the record. In claiming that women might have a differ-
ent attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school 
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, see 709 F. 2d, at 
1570, or that the organization's public positions would have a 
83-724-0PINION 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES JAYCEES 17 
different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's 
association," the Jaycees rely solely on unsupported general-
izations about the relative interests and perspectives of men 
and women. See Brief for Appellees 20-22 and n. 3. Al-
though such generalizations may or may not have a statistical 
basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by 
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decision-
making that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See, 
e. g., Palmore v. Sidoti,-- U.S.--,----- (1984); 
Heckler v. Mathews,-- U.S., at-----. In the ab-
sence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted 
by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyp-
ing that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing 
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change 
the content or impact of the organization's speech. Compare 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 
151-152 (1980) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 
508 (1975). 
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some 
incidental abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that 
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the 
State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of 
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly avail-
able goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils 
that government has a compelling interest to prevent-
wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may trans-
mit. Accordingly, like violence or other types of potentially 
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from 
their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no 
constitutional protection. Hishon v. King & Spalding,--
U.S.--,-- (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 
175-176 (1976). Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U. S. 886, 907-909 (1982) (peaceful picketing) with 
id., at 916 (violence). In prohibiting such practices, the Min-
nesota Act therefore "responds precisely to the substantive 
problem which legitimately concerns" the State and abridges 
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no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary to 
accomplish that purpose. See City Council v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, - U. S. -, - (1984). 
III 
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minne-
sota Act, as interpreted by the State's highest court, is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that "a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. 
General Constuction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1925). There-
quirement that government articulate its aims with a reason-
able degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exer-
cised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative 
choice among competing social values, reduces the danger 
of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the 
laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the re-
quirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review. 
See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson,-- U.S.--,-----
(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 
(1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404 
(1966). 
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are 
not seriously implicated by the Minnesota Act, either on its 
face or as construed in this case. In deciding that the Act 
reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a 
number of specific and objective criteria-regarding the 
organization's size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of 
public facilities-typically employed in determining the ap-
plicability of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes to 
the membership policies of assertedly private clubs. See, 
e. g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F. 2d 96 
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little 
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League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A. 2d 33, 
aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974). See gener-
ally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals 
seemingly acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construc-
tion of the Act by use of these familiar standards ensures that 
the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It never-
theless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a con-
stitutionally fatal element of uncertainty into the statute by 
suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be sufficiently "pri-
vate" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F. 2d, at 
1577. Like the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, 
however, we read the illustrative reference to the Kiwanis 
Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for 
choosing members on the basis of specific and selective crite-
ria, as simply providing a further refinement of the standards 
used to determine whether an organization is "public" or "pri-
vate." See id., at 1582 (Lay, C. J., dissenting). By offering 
this counter-example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's opin-
ion provided the statute with more, rather than less, definite 
content. 
The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club 
drawn by the Minnesota court also disposes of appellee's con-
tention that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad. The 
Jaycees argue that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping 
and improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
433 (1963), because it could be used to restrict the member-
ship decisions of wholly private groups organized for a wide 
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes. 
Without considering the extent to which such groups may be 
entitled to constitutional protection from the operation of the 
Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jay-
cees should "be viewed analogously to private organizations 
such as the Kiwanis International Organization." 305 N. W. 
2d, at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt 
limiting constructions that would exclude private groups 
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from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used 
and sufficiently precise standards it employed to determine 
that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act, 
as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk 
of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct. 
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217 
(1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 434. See New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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I have sent to the printer two minor additions to the 
opinion in this case. I will add the following sentence at 
the end of the full paragraph on page 11: "In view of the 
various protected activities in which the Jaycees engage, 
see infra, at 15-16, that right is plainly implicated in 
this case." At page 15, after the second sentence of the 
paragraph beginning "In applying ••• ," I will add to the 
citations to Buckley and American Party the following 
reference: "See Hishon v. King & Spalding, __ U.S. __ , 
(1984) (law firm "has not shown how its ability to 
fulfill [protected] function[s] would be inhibited by a 
requirement that it consider [a woman lawyer] for 
partnership on her merits"); id., at (POWELL, J., 
concurring)." -
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